1 BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON 3 IN THE MATTER OF ASARCO, INCORPORATED, 4 Appellant, PCHB No. 84-56 5 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, v. 6 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PUGET SOUND AIR POLLUTION 7 CONTROL AGENCY, and STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, 3 9 Respondents. 10

This matter, the appeal of a \$250 civil penalty for emissions allegedly in violation of respondent's Section 9.03(b) of Regulation I and WAC 173-400-040(1), came on for hearing before the Pollution Control Hearings Board; Gayle Rothrock, David Akana, and Lawrence J. Faulk, convened at Lacey, Washington, on April 26, 1984.

Administrative Appeals Judge William A. Harrison presided. Respondent elected a formal hearing pursuant to RCW 43.21B.230.

Appellant appeared by its attorney Michael R. Thorp. Respondent

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Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency appeared by its attorney
Keith D. McGoffin. Respondent Department of Ecology did not appear
but filed a written memorandum. Reporter Alison Fletcher recorded the
proceedings.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were examined. From testimony heard and exhibits examined, the Pollution Control Hearings Board makes these

FINDINGS OF FACT

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Appellant, ASARCO, Incorporated, owns and operates a copper smelter in Tacona, Washington.

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The process used to produce copper also produces a molten slag within the smelting furnace. This is skimmed off and put into the cars of a shuttle train. The train moves to a dumping area where the molten slag is released to flow across the ground. When air cooled, the slag hardens and is processed further.

III

On December 28, 1983, Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency's (PSAPCA's) inspector, while on routine patrol, made a surveillance of the slag dumping area. At 8:21 a.m., the slag train arrived with seven cars, six of which discharged molten slag onto the dumping area.

IV

As the slag was poured, a blue-white smoke emission occurred. At 8:24 a.n. the inspector began recording the opacity of the smoke. The

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inspector made his recordings from the adjacent property, a parking lot for the Tacoma Yacht Club.

V

The inspector observed the smoke, while recording its opacity, through the mesh of a green chain link fence which separated him from ASARCO property. The sun was behind and to the right of his back. It was mostly hidden by scattered clouds. The inspector's view was perpendicular to the plume and opacities were recorded at the densest part.

VΙ

Following the incident just set forth, the train left the dumping area and returned with more molten slag at 9:00 a.m. The inspector again recorded opacity of the smoke in the same manner as before.

VII

Appellant caused or allowed smoke emissions exceeding 20 percent opacity for 16 1/4 minutes in a one-hour period. Of this, opacity was at 100 percent for a total of one minute, 60 percent for a total of one minute and at no less than 35 percent for the remaining time necessary to exceed a total of three minutes.

VIII

Generally accepted texts for evaluating opacity agree that 1) the observer's view of an emission must not be obstructed, 2) the sun must be generally at the observer's back, and 3) the observer's line of vision must be approximately perpendicular to the plume direction.

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On January 18, 1984, appellant received a Notice and Order of Civil Penalty of \$250 for violation of both Section 9.03(b) of PSAPCA's Regulation I and WAC 173-400-040(1) of the regulations of respondent, State Department of Ecology (DOE). From this appellant filed its Notice of Appeal of February 16, 1984.

Any Conclusion of Law which is deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings of Fact, the Board comes to these CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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Any deviation fom generally accepted criteria for evaluating opacity lessens the evidentiary weight of respondent's case. criteria are not legal standards, every element of which must be proven to sustain a violation. International Paper Co. v. Southwest Air Pollution Control Authority, PCHB Nos. 77-55, 77-84, and 77-94 (1977). Rather, it is a matter of proof. In this matter, the inspector followed the procedure of generally accepted criteria regarding the position of the sun and maintaining a view perpendicular (See Findings of Fact V and VIII, above.) The further to the plume. requirement of an unobstructed view of the emission was met, with the exception of the green chain link fence. While this lessens the evidentiary weight of respondent's case to a minor degree, we conclude that PSAPCA has proven that appellant violated Section 9.03(b) and

1 WAC 173-400-040(1). Each of these prohibits emission of any air 2 contaminant (smoke) of more than 20 percent opacity for a period or 3 periods aggregating more than three minutes in any one hour. Opacity 4 in this instance ranged from 100 percent to no lower than 35 percent 5 for more than three minutes (see Findings of Fact VII, above). 6 ΙI 7 Appellant contends that PSAPCA, a local authority, does not have 8 authority to issue notices of violation or notices of civil penalty 9 based upon state regulation such as WAC 173-400-040(1), here. We 10 disagree. A local authority may enforce state regulations: 11 The [DOE] shall enforce the air quality standards and emission standards throughout the state 12 except where a local authority is enforcing the state regulations or its own regulations which are more 13 stringent than those of the state. (Emphasis added.) RCW 70.94.331(6). 14 Further, RCW 70.94.431 which authorizes the assessment of civil 15 penalties, provides: 16 ...any person who violates any of the provisions of 17 chapter 70.94 or any of the rules and regulations of the department or the board shall incur a penalty in 18 the form of a fine in an amount not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars per day for each violation. 19 (Emphasis added.) 20° Moreover, RCV 70.94.141(3) vests in local authorities the power to: 21Issue such orders as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter and enforce 22 the same by all appropriate administrative and judicial proceedings subject to the rights of appeals 23 as provided in chapter 62, Laws of 1970 ex sess. 24

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These provisions do not limit local authorities to assessment of

penalties for violation of only their own regulations. 1 2 TIT Appellant contends that Section 9.03(b) of Regulation I and WAC 3 4 173-400-840(1) make conduct unlawful which the Washington Clean Air Act, chapter 70.94 RCW, does not. Section 9.03(b) of Regulation I 5 6 provides, in pertinent part: 7 (b) After July 1, 1975, it shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow the emission of any air contaminant for a period or periods aggregating more 8 than three (3) minutes in any one hour which is: 9 (1) Darker in shade than that designated as 1 10 (20 percent density) on the Ringelmann Chart as published by the United State Bureau of Mines; or 11 (2) of such opacity as to obscure an observer's 12 view to a degree equal to or greater than does smoke in Subsection 9.03(b)(1).... 13 WAC 173-400-040(1) provides, in pertinent part: 14 (1) Visible Emissions. No person shall cause or 15 permit the emission for more than three minutes, in any one hour, of an air contaminant from any 16 emissions unit which at the emission point or within a reasonable distance of the emission point exceeds 17 twenty percent opacity... 18 Appellant cites Karser Aluminum v. PCHB, 33 Wn. App. 352 (1982) 19 for the contention that the above rules proscribe conduct which is not 20 made illegal by the statute. We disagree with that contention. See 21 St. Regis Corp. v. PSAPCA and DOE, PCHB No. 82-135 (1983), St. Regis 22 Corp. v. PSAPCA and DOE, PCNB No. 83-175 (1984) and St. Regis Corp. v. 23 PSAPCA and DOE, PCHB No. 83-214 (1984). 24 In Kaiser, supra, the Court of Appeals held:

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It is readily apparent that emitting particulate matter into the atmosphere is not proscribed. The law is offended only when the substance emitted has the characteristics of and is emitted for a duration which, together, create a <u>harmful</u> potential. (Emphasis added.)

The decision went on to say:

Regulation I, Section 9.04, however, provides:

SECTION 9.04 PARTICULATE MATTER

It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow the discharge of particulate matter which becomes deposited upon the real property of others,...

On its face, this regulation makes conduct unlawful which the enabling statute does not; the statute simply does not proscribe the mere emission of particulate matter. (Emphasis added.)

In proscribing opacity over 20 percent for more than 3 minutes in any one hour, Section 9.03(b) and WAC 173-400-040(1) control emissions with such characteristics (opacity over 20 percent) and for a duration (3 minutes in any one hour) which create a harmful potential. Neither proscribes mere emissions. The rules are consistent with the Washington Clean Air Act, chapter 70.94 RCW. 1

The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld a similar opacity standard in <u>Sittner v. Seattle</u>, 62 Wn.2d 834, 843, P.2d 859 (1963);

An ordinance to be void for unreasonableness must be plainly and clearly unreasonable. Although the "opacity" standard may not detect all of the air contaminants which pollute the air, we cannot say that it is not a reasonable means by which to detect some of the contaminating particles which smoke contains. It is no defense that the "opacity" standard does not regulate all air contamination but permits some emissions to go unpunished since a law designed to prevent one evil is not void because it does not prevent another. Similarly, while it is true that the Ringelmann Smoke Chart measures coloration and not opacity, it does not

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Lastly, appellant invokes the doctrine of collateral estoppel, offensively, to urge that respondent PSAPCA may not be heard concerning consistency of its Section 9.03(b) with the Clean Air Act, chapter 70.94 RCW as discussed at Conclusion of Law III, above. It urges that this is so because that issue was determined adversely to PSAPCA in a prior superior court judgment, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. v. PSAPCA, Nos. 251632 and 256239 (Superior Court for Pierce County). The requisites for collateral estoppel are:

ΙV

Before the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied, affirmative answers must be given to the following questions: (1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? (4) Will the application of the doctrine not work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be applied?

Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wn. App. 888, 894, 471 W.2d 103 (1970).

With regard to requisite number (4), we note that appellant was not a party to the proffered judgment nor was respondent Department of Ecology which has a rule nearly the same as respondent PSAPCA's.

necessarily follow that the chart may not be reasonably used as a basis for determining opacity. The Ringelmann Smoke Chart has been widely accepted throughout the United States as a measurement of air pollution by both legislatures and courts, and we find ourselves in agreement with the wisdom of this acceptance.

´1 Moreover, the superior court judgment, on appeal, was affirmed on different grounds (a requirement for scienter) than the judgment is offered for here. Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency V. Kaiser, 25 Wn. App 273, 607 P.2d 870 (1980). The interpretation of the Court of Appeals calling for scienter was countermanded by legislation. Chapter 175, Laws of 1980 effective June 12, 1980. Court of Appeals, on review, did not rule upon the issue for which appellant now offers the superior court judgment, namely the issue discussed at Conclusion of Law III, above.

Under these circumstances, we conclude that application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel would work an injustice if applied against PSAPCA. We decline to apply it.

Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

From these Conclusions of Law the Board enters this

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ORDER The \$250 civil penalty is affirmed. DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 140 day of May, 1984. POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD Did not participate in decision BAVID AKANA, Lawyer Hember IIAULK, Vice Chairman WILLIAM A. MARRISON Administrative Appeals Judge FIRAL FINDINGS OF FACT,

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